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The dominant theorisation of the informal economy views participants as rational economic 
actors operating in the informal economy when the expected benefits exceed the perceived costs 
of being caught and punished. Recently, an alternative theory has emerged which views 
participants as social actors operating in the informal economy due to their lack of vertical trust 
(in governments) and horizontal trust (in others). The aim of this paper is to evaluate these 
competing theorisations.   
Methodology 
To do so, data are reported from special Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2007, 2013 and 
2019 respectively in eight West European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the United Kingdom).    
Findings 
Using probit regression analysis, the finding is that increasing the expected likelihood of being 
caught and level of punishment had a weak significant impact on the likelihood of participating 
in the informal economy in 2007, and no significant impact in 2013 and 2019. However, greater 
vertical and horizontal trust is significantly associated with a lower level of participation in the 




The outcome is a call for a policy to shift away from increasing the expected level of punishment 
and likelihood of being caught, and towards improving vertical and horizontal trust. How this 
can be achieved is explored.   
Originality/value 
Evidence is provided in a Western European context to support a shift away from a rational 
economic actor to a social actor approach when explaining and tackling the informal economy.  
 
Keywords: informal sector; tax compliance; public policy; Western Europe. 




The informal economy remains a persistent feature of the global economy (ILO 2018; OECD, 
2017; World Bank, 2019). Defined as paid activities not declared to the authorities for the 
purpose of evading tax and social security contributions and/or lab ur laws (OECD, 2017; 
Williams, 2019; Williams and Krasniqi, 2017; Williams et al., 2017a; World Bank, 2019), 61 
per cent of workers globally have their main employment in the informal economy (ILO, 2018) 
and eight out of ten enterprises globally operate in the informal economy (ILO, 2020). Although 
more prevalent in lower-income countries (ILO, 2018), it persists in advanced economies. In 
Europe, it is estimated as equivalent to 15.8 per cent of GDP (Williams and Schneider, 2016) 
and 11.6 per cent of all labour input in the private sector is in nformal economy (Williams et 
al., 2017b). This has negative consequences. Informal workers have poorer w king conditions 
(Williams and Horodnic, 2019), purchasers lack legal recourse and insurance cover (OECD, 
2017), formal enterprises suffer unfair competition (OECD, 2017; World Bank, 2019) and 
informal enterprises lack legal protection and have poor access to capital to grow (Loayza, 
2018). More widely, governments lose tax revenue and regulatory cntrol over working 
conditions (ILO, 2018; World Bank, 2019). Therefore, addressing the informal economy has 
risen to the top of policy agendas across supra-national institutions (ILO, 2015; European 
Commission, 2016; OECD, 2017; World Bank, 2019) and national governments (Williams, 
2019).   
  To explain the informal economy, the dominant theory f r some five decades has 
conceptualised participants as rational economic actors operating in the informal economy 
when the benefits outweigh the costs (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). Recently, nevertheless, 
this rational economic actor view has been questioned becaus  many do not operate in the 
informal economy when the benefits exceed the costs (Alm et al., 2012; Kirchler, 2007; 
Williams et al., 2015). The outcome has been a social actorthe y explaining participation in 
the informal economy to result from a lack of vertical trust in government (Alm et al., 2010; 
Torgler, 2007) and horizontal trust in others (Hallsworth et al., 2017; Lefebvre et al., 2015). 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate these competing theorisati ns.  
 To achieve this, the next section reviews the dominant rational economic actor and 
emergent social actor theories and the concomitant discussion about whether they are mutually 
exclusive or not. The third section then introduces the data and methodology to evaluate these 
theories, namely a probit regression analysis of Eurobarometer surveys conducted in 2007, 2013 
and 2019, comprising in each case some 8,000 interviews in Western Europe, selected for 
analysis as a counterweight to the fact that the vast majority of scholarship so far on the informal 
economy has been on emerging and transition economies. Th  findings are reported in the 
fourth section. Revealing no association between participa on in the informal economy and the 
costs of being caught and punished, but a significant positive association between engagement 
in the informal economy and vertical and horizontal trust, the fifth and final section then draws 
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conclusions and discusses the implications for theory and policy, along with the limitations of 
the study and future research required. 
 
Explaining participation in the informal economy: a literature review 
 
A cursory glance at the extensive literature explaining engagement in the informal economy 
reveals two theoretical perspectives. Here, each is review d in turn along with the scholarship 
discussing whether they are mutually exclusive or not.  
 
Theorising participants as rational economic actors 
Most scholarship on explaining and tackling the informal economy is founded upon a view of 
participants as rational economic actors who weigh up the ben fits of participating against the 
costs of doing so and participate if the benefits outweigh the costs. This has its roots in the 
utilitarian theory of crime (Bentham, 1788) which views crime as occurring when the benefits 
outweigh the calculated costs, namely the likelihood of being caught and penalised. This theory 
of crime was re-popularised during the late 1960s by Becker (1968) who argued that acting 
lawfully would become a rational choice if governments increased the probability of detection 
and sanctions for criminal acts. This was then applied a few years later to the field of tax non-
compliance by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), who argued that taxes are ev ded when the 
benefits exceed the expected costs and thus that there is a need to change the cost/benefit ratio. 
The result was a call to deter engagement by increasing the expected risk of being caught and 
sanctions.  
 This was subsequently widely adopted by governments. A 2017 survey of 
representatives of 28 national governments in Europe found that these governments ranked 
penalties as the most important and effective policy measure for tackling the informal economy 
followed by improving the probability of being caught (Williams, 2019). Nevertheless, the 
evidence to support this is mixed. Some studies identify that raising the probability of being 
caught and/or punishments prevents participation in the informal economy (Kluge and Libman, 
2017; Mas’ud et al., 2015), with most finding that increasing the probability of being caught is 
more effective than higher sanctions (Williams and Horodnic, 2017a,b). However, others reveal 
that increasing the probability of being caught and penalties has no effect on participation 
(Dularif et al., 2019; Hartl et al., 2015) and yet others that i  leads to higher participation due to 
the breakdown in the social contract between the state and its citizens (Kirchler et al., 2014; 
Mohdali et al., 2014; Murphy, 2005, 2008). Therefore, to evaluate this rational economic actor 
approach, the following hypothesis can be tested: 
  
Rational economic actor hypothesis (H1): higher perceived punishments and risks of 
being caught decrease the likelihood of participation in the informal economy, ceteris 
paribus. 
H1a: higher perceived punishments decrease the likelihood of partici tion in the 
informal economy, ceteris paribus. 
H1b: higher perceived risks of being caught decrease the likelihood of participation in 
the informal economy, ceteris paribus. 
 
Theorising participants as social actors 
The critique of the rational economic actor approach was expressed by its founders in their 
seminal paper establishing this approach. They state, “This is a very simple theory, and it may 
perhaps be criticized for giving too little attention to nonpecuniary factors in the taxpayer’s 
decision on whether or not to evade taxes” (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972: 326). The 
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subsequent finding has been that many do not participate in thformal economy even when 
the benefits exceed the costs (Alm et al., 2010; Kirchler, 2007; Murphy, 2008). To explain this, 
a social actor approach has emerged (Williams et al., 2015).  
 Grounded in a variant of institutional theory in which institutions are viewed as the rules 
of the game prescribing acceptable behaviour (Helmke and Levistky, 2004; North, 1990), 
engagement in the informal economy is explained to result from the gap between the prescribed 
rules of the game in the laws and regulations (the formal institutions) and the socially shared 
unwritten rules expressed in citizens’ norms, values and beliefs (the informal institutions). The 
size of the gap reflects the level of vertical trust, measured when studying the informal economy 
using the level of tax morale (i.e. the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes). The larger the gap, the 
lower is tax morale and the greater is participation in the informal economy (Alm et al., 2010; 
Torgler, 2007, 2011). This has been shown in studies of specific European nations (Williams et 
al., 2016; Windebank and Horodnic, 2017), European regions (Williams and Horodnic, 2017b) 
and Europe as a whole (Williams and Horodnic, 2017a; Williams et al., 2015).  
 Recently, social actor theory has been further advanced by contending that participation 
is also associated with the level of horizontal trust, by which is meant the degree of trust in 
others not to operate in the informal economy (Fellner et al., 2013). Participation in the informal 
economy is asserted to be greater when others are perceived as likely to engage in the informal 
economy. Nevertheless, the evidence that participation is conditional on the behaviour of others 
derives largely from laboratory experiments (Hallsworth et al., 2017; Lefebvre et al., 2015; 
Traxler, 2010). Hence, to evaluate this social actor theory, the following hypothesis can be 
tested: 
 
Social actor hypothesis (H2): higher levels of vertical and horizontal trust decrease the 
likelihood of participation in the informal economy, ceteris paribus. 
H2a: higher levels of vertical trust decrease the likelihood of participation in the informal 
economy, ceteris paribus. 
H2b: higher levels of horizontal trust decrease the likelihood of participation in the 
informal economy, ceteris paribus. 
 
Mutually exclusive or inclusive theories  
Most scholars adopt either rational economic actor or s cial actor theory. Recently, 
nevertheless, some have asked whether these explanations might be combined. This has resulted 
in two approaches.  
A first “responsive regulation” approach has combined them by conceptualising a 
regulatory pyramid with measures to improve vertical (and horizontal) trust used first, and 
deterrents used last (Braithwaite, 2002, 2009; Job et al., 2007). A second “slippery slope” 
approach combines them by arguing that both the deterrence measures of the rational economic 
actor approach and the social actor measures of improving vertical and horizontal trust should 
be used concurrently (Kogler et al., 2013; Khurana and Diwan, 2014). Based on largely 
laboratory experiments, using both approaches concurrently (rather than consecutively) is 
identified as most effective (Kogler et al., 2013; Williams and Horodnic, 2017a).   
Nevertheless, there may be interaction effects when combining the approaches. 
Increasing the sanctions and risk of detection may produce different outcomes at different levels 
of vertical trust. If vertical trust is high, it may breakdown trust between the state and the 
population and increase participation in the informal economy (Kirchler et al., 2014), but if 
vertical trust is already low, it might not. Until now, there is little understanding of these 




Moderating effects of vertical trust hypothesis (H3): the effects of higher perceived 
punishments and risks of being caught on the likelihood of participa on in the informal 
economy will vary by the level of vertical trust, ceteris paribus. 
H3a: the effects of higher perceived punishments on the likelihood of participation in 
the informal economy will vary by the level of vertical trust, ceteris paribus. 
H3b: the effects of higher perceived risks of being caught on the likelihood of 
participation in the informal economy will vary by the level of vertical trust, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
Moderating effects of horizontal trust hypothesis (H4): the effects of higher perceived 
punishments and risks of being caught on the likelihood of participa on in the informal 
economy will vary by the level of horizontal trust, ceteris paribus. 
H4a: the effects of higher perceived punishments on the likelihood of participation in 
the informal economy will vary by the level of horizontal trust, ceteris paribus. 
H4b: the effects of higher perceived risks of being caught on the likelihood of 





To evaluate these hypotheses, data is reported from eight West European countries (Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands  the United Kingdom) for 
the years 2007, 2013 and 2019, from special Eurobarometer surveys 67.3, 79.2 and 92.1 
respectively. A multi-stage random (probability) sampling methodology was used, which 
ensured that on the issues of gender, age, region and locality size, both the national and each 
level of the sample is representative in proportion to its population size. All interviews were 
conducted in the national language with adults aged 15 years and older.  
 
Variables 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable with value 1 for respondents answering “yes” to 
the 2007 survey question of “Did you yourself carry out any undeclared activities in the last 12 
months for which you were paid in money or in kind?” and to the 2013 and 2019 surveys 
question of “Apart from a regular employment, have you yourself carried out any undeclared 
paid activities in the last 12 months?”, and value 0 otherwise. 
To evaluate the theories, four explanatory variables are used. First, the association 
between the perceived punishments and engagement in the informal economy uses a dummy 
variable describing the punishments expected with value 0 for normal tax or social security 
contributions due and value 1 for normal tax or social security contributions due, plus a fine or 
prison. Second, the association between the risks of being caught and participation in the formal 
economy used a dummy variable with value 0 for a very small or fairly small risk of being 
caught and value 1 for a fairly high or very high risk. 
 Third, the relationship between participation in the informal economy and vertical trust 
uses tax morale as a proxy measure of vertical trust (Alm and Torgler, 2006). Participants rate 
the acceptability of six types of informal economic activity using a 10-point Likert scale (where 
1 means absolutely unacceptable and 10 means absolutely acceptable), n mely: an individual 
is hired by a household and s/he does not declare the payment rec ived to the tax or social 
security authorities even though it should be declared; a firm is hired by a household and it does 
not declare the payment received to the tax or social security authorities; a firm is hired by 
another firm and it does not declare its activities to the tax or social security authorities; a firm 
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hires an individual and all or a part of the wages paid to him/her are not officially declared; 
someone receives welfare payments without entitlement (not available in the 2019 survey), and 
someone evades taxes by not declaring or only partially declaring their income. For each 
respondent, an aggregate tax morale index was constructed by collating and equally weighting 
their responses to these six (five in 2019) questions. The lower the value of the index, the higher 
is their tax morale. The Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient of the scale, which reveals a good internal 
consistency of the scale (Kline, 2000), is 0.8439 in 2007, 0.8576 in 2013 and 0.8703 in 2019.   
Fourth and finally, the association between participation in the informal economy and 
horizontal trust uses the survey question “Do you personally know any people who work 
without declaring their income or part of their income to tax or social security institutions?”, 
akin to previous studies (Horodnic and Williams, 2020), with a dummy variable where value 1 
is for those who know someone participating in the informal economy and 0 otherwise.   
Meanwhile, and in line with past studies evaluating participation in the informal 
economy (Williams and Horodnic, 2016, 2017a,b), the control variables selected are:  
 Gender: A dummy variable with value 0 for females and 1 for males; 
 Age: A continuous variable indicating the exact age of a respondent; 
 Employment status: a categorical variable grouping respondent by their employment 
status with value 1 for self-employed, value 2 for employed, and value 3 for not 
working; 
 People 15+ years in own household: a categorical variable for people 15+ years in 
respondent`s household (including the respondent) with value 1 for one person, value 2 
for two persons, value 3 for 3 persons or more; 
 Children: a dummy variable for the presence of children up to 14 years old in the 
household with value 0 for individuals with no children and value 1 for those having 
children; 
 Difficulties paying bills: a categorical variable for the difficulties in paying bills (used 
by Eurobarometer surveys as a proxy for household income) with value 1 for having 
difficulties most of the time, value 2 for occasionally, and value 3 for almost 
never/never, and 
 Area: a categorical variable for the area where the respondent lives with value 1 for rural 
area or village, value 2 for small or middle-sized town, and value 3 for large town. 
 
Analytical methods  
Probit regression analysis is used for testing hypotheses about the relationship between a 
categorical dependent variable and one or more categorical r ontinuous independent variables 
(Greene, 2018). Therefore, using STATA software for estimation of the models, it is here used. 
The maximum likelihood method is used to estimate the least squares function. The log-
likelihood function for probit is   健券詣 噺 布 降珍健券剛盤捲珍紅匪 髪珍樺聴 布 降珍健券版な 伐 剛岫捲珍紅繁珍鞄聴  
where 思 is the standard cumulative normal and 降珍 denotes the optional weights. lnL is 
maximized. Using probit analysis, the following model is adopted: Pr盤芝珍 塙 ど弁捲珍匪 噺  剛盤捲珍紅匪 
The dependent variable of the model (芝珍岻 is binary, which represents participation in the 
informal economy, x represents the explanatory variables including the control variables, which 
are expected punishment, risk of being caught, level of tax morale, level of horizontal trust, 
gender, age, employment status, people 15+ years in own household, c ildren, difficulties 
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paying bills (only available for 2013 and 2019 survey), and area (see Tabl  1 for a description 
of the variables). Moreover, the interaction term is used for investigating moderating effects. 




Table 1 reveals that in 2007, 5.5 per cent of the citizens surveyed in the eight West European 
countries reported participating in the informal economy in the prior 12 months, 4.3 per cent in 
2013 and 3.8 per cent in 2019. Therefore, the share of citizens participating in the informal 
economy has declined.  
Those not participating in the informal economy are much more likely to perceive the 
punishment as higher than those participating in the informal economy in all three time periods. 
They are also more likely to view the risk of being caught as higher than those participating in 
the informal economy in each time period. Those participating in the informal economy have a 
lower mean tax morale than those not participating in 2007, 2013 and 2019, and a much lower 
level of horizontal trust than those not participating across all three time periods, although 
horizontal trust improved over the 2007 to 2019 period both for those participating and not 
participating in the informal economy.   
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Turning to who participates in the informal economy, the finding is that men are more likely 
than women to do so both in 2007, 2013 and 2019, as are younger people. Analyzing the 
employment status of participants in the informal economy, the proportion in formal 
employment has remained relatively constant at 42 per cent, 39 per cent and 40 per cent in 
2007, 2013 and 2019 respectively, whilst the proportion self-employed has fallen from 12 per 
cent in 2007 to 10 per cent in 2013 and 2019, and the proportion not working has risen from 46 
per cent in 2007 to 51 per cent in 2013 and 50 per cent in 2019. Those living in households with 
three or more adults are more likely to engage in the informal economy and those living in two-
adult households less likely in all three time periods. There is an increase in 2019 in the share 
of informal economy participants who have children, although there is little difference between 
those working in the informal economy and not doing so in terms of having children. Few 
differences exist between rural and urban areas. Those who have difficulties most of the time 
in paying bills are more likely to engage in the informal economy and those who almost never 
or never have difficulties are less likely to do so. Hwever, between 2013 and 2019, there is an 
increase in the proportion of informal workers who almost never or never have difficulties in 
paying the household bills and a decline in the proportion who have difficulties most of the 
time. This intimates that participation in the informal economy has become less confined over 
time to poorer populations in Western Europe.     
 To evaluate whether these descriptive findings are valid when other variables are 
introduced and held constant, Table 2 reports probit estimates of he likelihood of participating 
in the informal economy in Western Europe in these three time periods. Examining who 
participates in the informal economy, the finding is that men were significantly more likely than 
women in 2007 and 2013 but not in 2019, although younger people are significantly more likely 
over all three time periods. Those not working and in formal employment are both significantly 
less likely to participate in the informal economy than the self-employed in 2007, 2013 and 
2019. Although two-adult households were significantly less likely than single person 
households to participate than single person households in 2007 and 2013, this was no longer 
the case in 2019, whilst those with children were not significatly less likely to engage in the 
informal economy in 2007 but were in 2013 and 2019, albeit to a weaker xtent. Although those 
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living in larger urban areas were significantly less likely to participate in 2007, this tendency 
disappeared in 2013 but re-emerged in 2019. Finally, those who almost never/never have 
difficulties paying bills, and those from time to time having difficulties, are significantly less 
likely to participate in the informal economy than those having difficulties most of the time in 
both 2013 and 2019. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
  
Evaluating the hypotheses, although in 2007, the greater the perceived punishment, the 
significantly less likely were citizens to participate, the signif cance of this association 
disappeared in 2013 and 2019. Similarly, although participation was significantly lower the 
higher the expected risk of being caught in 2007, this significance again disappeared in 2013 
and 2019. As such, although the rational economic actor hypotheses H1a and H1 were 
confirmed in 2007, this was not the case in 2013 and 2019.  
However, a strong significant association is identified between participation in the 
informal economy and vertical trust in all three time periods. The greater the level of vertical 
trust, measured by tax morale, the lower is the likelihood of participation in the informal 
economy (confirming hypothesis H2a). Similarly, the greater the rust in others, the 
significantly lower is the likelihood of participating in the informal economy (confirming 
hypothesis H2b).    
To analyse whether vertical and horizontal trust moderate the effects and effectiveness 
of penalties and risk of detection, the impact of the level of punishment on the likelihood of 
participation does not vary by the level of vertical trust (refuting H3a). Neither does the effects 
of the level of punishment on the likelihood of participation significantly vary by the level of 
horizontal trust (refuting H4a). However, the impact of the perceived risk of being caught on 
the likelihood of participation does vary by the level of tax morale, but only in 2013. It does not 
significantly vary in 2007 and 2019. The lower the vertical trust, the more likely is the risk of 
being caught likely to influence participation. Similarly, the impact of the perceived risk of 
being caught on the likelihood of participation varies by the level of horizontal trust but only 
weakly in 2007 (partially confirming H4b). It does not significantly vary in 2013 and 2019. The 
lower the level of horizontal trust, the more likely is the risk of being caught to influence 
participation in the informal economy in 2007. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Reporting data from the 2007, 2013 and 2019 special Eurobarometer surveys, the finding is that 
increasing the expected risk of being caught and level of punishment had a weak significant 
impact on the likelihood of participating in the informal economy in 2007, and no significant 
impact on participation in 2013 and 2019. However, greater vertical and horizontal trust is 
significantly associated with a lower level of participation n the informal economy in all three 
time periods, and there are some significant interaction effects. Table 3 summarises the 
findings. Here, the theoretical and policy implications are considered. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Theoretically, this paper advances knowledge in three respects. Firstly, although some weak 
evidence exists in 2007 to support the conventional rational economic actor theorisation, there 
was no evidence in 2013 and 2019 that increasing the punishments and ri ks of being caught 
reduces participation. Secondly, it reveals support for the social actor approach in all three time 
periods and the need to extend this theory to recognise the role of horizontal as well vertical 
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trust in reducing participation. Until now, largely laboratory experiments have shown the 
relevance of horizontal trust. This study reveals this is also valid in lived practice. Thirdly, it 
has been revealed that increasing the perceived risk of being caught might be effective for those 
with lower vertical and horizontal trust, although the association is weak and only relevant in 
some time periods. Overall, therefore, this paper provides evidence to support the view that 
participants in the informal economy are more social actors engaging in such activity when 
there is low vertical and horizontal trust rather than rational economic actors who participate in 
such activity when the expected benefits outweigh the perceiv d costs.    
 Turning to the policy implications, this paper reveals the ne d to shift beyond increasing 
the punishments and risks of being caught and towards building vertical and horizontal trust. 
This will require a significant change in policy approach. How, therefore, can this be achieved? 
To enhance vertical trust, there is a need to align the laws and regulations of formal institutions 
with the norms, beliefs and values of informal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; North 
1990). To align them, either the informal and/or the formal institutions can be changed. To 
change norms, values and beliefs regarding the acceptability of informal work, education and 
awareness raising initiatives are required, such as “your taxes paid for this” billboards on 
ambulances and fire engines, in hospitals, and on public facilities. The population groups to 
target, as shown, are younger age groups, the self-employed, people with no children, those 
living in rural areas and villages, and with difficulties paying the bills most of the time. Vertical 
trust can also be improved by changing the formal institutions. As previous studies reveal, 
participation in the informal economy decreases when there is procedural fairness, with citizens 
believing they pay their fair share (Molero and Pujol, 2012), procedural justice, with citizens 
believing that the state treats them respectfully and impartially (Kogler et al., 2013; Murphy, 
2005), and redistributive justice, with citizens believing that ey receive the public goods they 
deserve (Kogler et al., 2013).  
 To enhance horizontal trust, meanwhile, there is a need for state authorities to stop 
publicising statistics on the sizeable magnitude of the informal economy. This is deleterious to 
horizontal trust. Instead, messages should emphasise the high levels of compliance. Previous 
research reveals such messages are most effective when tailored to the targeted recipient by 
including data on their occupation, industry and/or local area (Hallsworth et al., 2017).  
This paper, nevertheless, has its limitations. It only examines Western Europe. There is 
therefore a need for caution when extrapolating these findings to other global regions and 
countries. For example, the perception of the level of penalties and risk of being caught may 
differ across global regions and countries. Whether the findings are valid in other contexts 
requires testing. Moreover, due to the data set limitations, this study has used a proxy indicator 
for household income, namely the frequency with which the household has witnessed financial 
difficulties. It has also used two proxy indicators for ve tical and horizontal trust that could be 
extended in future studies. A limitation of this study is thate specific formal institutions (e.g. 
judiciary, politicians, tax administrations) in which verical trust is lacking have not been 
identified, and other forms of horizontal trust beyond generalized trust not investigated. These 
issues could be evaluated in future studies.  
 In sum, if the outcome of this paper is that these theorizations of participation in the 
informal economy, and the interplay between them, are evaluated in other global regions, then 
one of the intentions of this paper will have been fulfilled. If West European governments 
recognize the need to move beyond increasing the level of punishments and risk of being 
caught, and towards building vertical and horizontal trust, then he other more practice-oriented 
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Source: 2019 Eurobarometer 92.1 survey, 2013 Eurobarometer 79.2 survey and 2007 Eurobarometer 67.3 survey 
  
 Participating in 
informal economy 
Not participating in 
informal economy 
 2007 2013 2019 2007 2013 2019 
All surveyed (%) 5.5 4.3 3.8 94.5 95.7 96.2 
Perceived punishment (%)       
Tax or social security 
contributions due 
28 28 32 17 22 20 
Tax or social security 
contributions + fine or prison 
72 72 68 83 78 80 
Risk of being caught (%)       
Very small/fairly small    76 73 69 63 58 56 
Fairly high/very high 24 27 31 37 42 44 
Tax morale – vertical trust (mean) 3.71 3.71 4.05 2.32 2.25 2.43 
Know anyone who works 
undeclared - horizontal trust (%) 
      
Yes 88 85 80 43 32 33 
No 12 15 20 57 68 67 
Gender (%)       
   Female 38 42 47 55 52 52 
Male  62 53 53 45 48 48 
Age (mean) 36 36 39 48 49 52 
Occupation (%)       
   Self-Employed 12 10 10 5 6 6 
Employed 42 39 40 46 45 43 
Not working 46 51 50 49 49 51 
People 15+ years in own 
household  
      
   One 25 31 27 25 26 27 
Two  41 39 40 51 51 53 
Three and More 34 30 33 24 23 20 
Children (%)       
No children 93 96 72 94 95 76 
Having children 7 4 28 6 5 24 
Area (%)       
Rural area or village 44 37 36 38 35 34 
Small or middle-sized town 35 39 40 37 40 39 
Large town 21 24 24 25 25 27 
Difficulties paying bills (%)       
Most of the time - 18 12 - 8 5 
From time to tome - 33 26 - 24 17 
Almost never/never - 49 62 - 68 78 
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Table 2. Probit estimates of the propensity to participate in the informal economy in Western 
Europe, 2007, 2013 and 2019 
Source: author calculations from 2019 Eurobarometer 92.1 survey, 2013 Eurobarometer 79.2 survey and 2007 
Eurobarometer 67.3 survey  
Notes: Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. All coefficients are compared 
to the benchmark category, shown in brackets. When multiple imputation techniques are used (ten imputations 
were simulated through a system of chained equations for every missing value) for addressing the missing 
responses, the same variables are significantly associ ted. Therefore, we use no imputation to minimize bias. 
  
 2007 2013 2019 






Expected punishment (Tax or social security contributions due)  
+ fine or prison -0.337* (0.203) -0.0398 (0.206) -0.214 (0.186) 
Risk of being caught (Very small/fairly small)   
Fairly high/very high -0.443** (0.213) 0.138 (0.179) -0.102 (0.152) 
Vertical Trust 0.132*** (0.0330) 0.234*** (0.0391) 0.115*** (0.0314) 
Horizontal Trust 0.871*** (0.158) 1.060*** (0.162) 0.811*** (0.147) 
Gender (Female)    
Male 0.260*** (0.0612) 0.164** (0.0692) 0.0843 (0.0649) 
Age (exact age) -0.0180*** (0.00191) -0.0203*** (0.00209) -0.0196*** (0.00208) 
Occupation (Self-employed)   
Employed -0.439*** (0.105) -0.322*** (0.119) -0.429*** (0.117) 
Not working -0.192* (0.107) -0.0495 (0.118) -0.242** (0.117) 
People 15+ years in own household (One)   
Two -0.195** (0.0763) -0.195** (0.0814) -0.0146 (0.0813) 
Three and more -0.116 (0.0829) -0.154* (0.0922) 0.0663 (0.0897) 
Children (No children)    
Having children -0.0525 (0.116) -0.342** (0.167) -0.142* (0.0787) 
Area (Rural area or village)   
Small or middle-sized 
town 
-0.0766 (0.0689) -0.0502 (0.0772) -0.0449 (0.0752) 
Large town -0.202** (0.0791) -0.101 (0.0879) -0.141* (0.0851) 
Difficulties paying bills (Most of the time)   
From time to time  -0.184* (0.107) -0.286** (0.126) 
Almost never/ never  -0.368*** (0.102) -0.401*** (0.116) 
Interactions    
Punishment x Vertical 
Trust 
0.0534 (0.0367) 0.00632 (0.0416) 0.00878 (0.0342) 
Detection x Vertical Trust 0.0321 (0.0391) -0.0788** (0.0376) -0.0115 (0.0298) 
Punishment x Horizontal 
Trust 
-0.116 (0.171) -0.0139 (0.173) 0.00763 (0.159) 
Detection x Horizontal 
Trust 
0.323* (0.166) -0.0861 (0.158) -0.0505 (0.146) 
Constant -1.176*** (0.238) -1.530*** (0.268) -0.773*** (0.266) 
    
N 6475 6495 6758 
Pseudo R2 0.2274 0.2745 0.2165 
Log pseudolikelihood -1065.136 -835.1518 -858.3822 
ぬ2 388.05 432.34 352.29 
p> 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 3. Summary findings of hypotheses 
Hypothesis 2007 2013 2019 
Rational economic actor hypothesis (H1):    
H1a: higher perceived punishments Accept Reject Reject 
H1b: higher perceived risks of being caught Accept Reject Reject 
Social actor hypothesis (H2):    
H2a: higher levels of vertical trust. Accept Accept Accept 
H2b: higher levels of horizontal trust Accept Accept Accept 
Moderating effects of vertical trust hypothesis (H3):    
H3a: effects of higher perceived punishments on participation 
vary by vertical trust 
Reject Reject Reject 
H3b: effects of higher perceived risks of being caught on 
participation vary by vertical trust 
Reject Accept Reject 
Moderating effects of horizontal trust hypothesis (H4):    
H4a: effects of higher perceived punishments on participation 
vary by horizontal trust 
Reject Reject Reject 
H4b: effects of higher perceived risks of being caught on 
participation vary by horizontal trust 
Accept Reject Reject 
 
 
